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9. At 291f£., Stout discusses "three 'formidable constituencies' that are
currently contending for control of the American state." He remarks that
"[d]emocracy will face unpromising odds at the national level so long as the
three entrenched constituencies jointly control the political landscape" (292).
I would add that the state itself is a formidable political actor which can pose
its own distinctive threat to democracy.
10. See, for example, the interview with Hauerwas posted at: http://www
.beliefnet.com/storyI146/story_14666_1.html.
Speaking of Dietrich Bonhoeffer, the interviewer said to Hauerwas "But his
beef with liberal democracy seems more philosophical and thoroughgoing.
He says that the language of rights and liberties, as you write in your book,
'cannot help but lead to godlessness and the subsequent deification of man,
which is the proclamation of nihilism.'" Hauerwas replied "That's right, and
in noting that, I hoped some people would see a parallel to the present day in
this country."
11. See 289, where Stout says "Assuming, as I do, that democratic individuality is a good thing, not to be confused with atomistic dissolution of
social life."
12. See 308: "we should not imagine the life-giving sources on which we
depend as something alien to American democratic modernity. That stream is
in us and of us when we engage in our democratic practices."
13. Stout seems to treat his faith in his fellow citizens as basic. It seems to be
on the basis of such faith that he puts his hope in democracy. In moving from
faith in his fellow citizens to faith in democracy, Stout reverses what I believe
to be the more plausible order of argument followed by Rawls. Rawls argues
first (and at very great length) that it is possible for human beings to sustain a
just liberal democracy. He then argues from this conclusion to the conclusion
that human beings have a moral nature; see Political Liberalism, lxi-Ixii.
Clearly Rawls can proceed as he does because he has substantive standards
of justice available to him: he takes a liberal democracy to be just only if its political outcomes are constrained by reasonable principles of justice. Since Stout
does not endorse principles of justice or any other criteria for just political outcomes, he is not in a position to say much about what a just liberal democracy
would be like. If he cannot say what a just liberal democracy would be like,
then it is hard to see how he can argue that it is possible for people to sustain
a just liberal democracy except by appeal to faith in his fellow citizens. In that
case, the Rawlsian order of argument may not be open to him.

Freedom and Anthropology in Kant's Moral Philosophy, by Patrick R. Frierson.
Cambridge University Press, 2003. Pp. x + 211 pages. $55.00 (hardback).
HEINER BIELEFELDT, Director of the German Institute for Human Rights,
Berlin
Patrick Frierson's book fits into a series of recent Kant publications devoted to challenging the stereotype that Kantian philosophy is a purely
abstract enterprise, largely disconnected from human experience. The
most famous formulation of that stereotype, which itself was already
brought up by some of Kant's contemporaries, is Hegel's allegation that
the Kantian moral law remains "something empty which can never become reality." However, like Onora O'Neill, Allan Wood, Paul Guyer, and
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Robert Louden (to name only a few) Frierson demonstrates that Kant's
moral philosophy does in fact connect with the real world. In order to
account for that connection, anthropology plays a crucial role. For Kant,
anthropology represents empirical knowledge about human beings in
the broadest sense, encompassing a range of different disciplines, such as
physiology, psychology, education, history, and even facets of what later
will be called sociology. Thus, taking anthropology into account can make
a big difference for a more comprehensive understanding of Kant's moral
philosophy. It adds dimensions, often neglected in traditional Kant literature, such as emotions, feelings, education, character building, or the
rules of politeness.
Whereas there seems to be a general agreement among Kant scholars
that anthropological knowledge, as Kant himself has pointed out, can
have a bearing at least on the application of the categorical imperative,
Frierson goes an important step further. Rather than merely facilitating
a more appropriate use of an already existing moral will, he claims that
anthropology is significant for understanding and promoting the very
development of the moral will. Empirical factors, he contends, can have
an influence on the cultivation and stabilization of the moral will. They
can provide assistance for defending the moral will against temptations
to transgress the moral law. Besides supporting the cultivation of one's
own will, they can also serve as devices for the moral education of others. Hence Frierson concludes that empirical anthropology, rather than
belonging merely to the margins of applied ethics, affects the very center
of Kant's moral philosophy.
At the same time, Frierson is anxious to keep the systematic insights
of Kant's practical philosophy uncompromised. He criticizes some Kant
scholars for having sacrificed the specific features of Kantianism in order
to make Kant's philosophy more persuasive to common sense. What is
distinctive in Kant's moral philosophy, according to Frierson, is his conception of freedom as something beyond theoretical deduction as well as empirical fixation. As Kant argues, freedom reveals itself via the awareness of the
moral law, an awareness which due to its peculiar obtrusiveness can be
compared to a fact. However, it is a /lon-empirical fact which Kant calls the
"fact of reason" that "forces itself upon us of itself as a synthetic a priori
proposition." In order to underline the trans-empirical dimension of the
awareness of the moral law, Kant repeatedly speaks of the "inscrutability"
of freedom. Unlike those Kant scholars who more or less replace the philosophy of transcendental freedom with an empirical ethics that certainly
cannot do justice to Kant's philosophical aspirations, Frierson sticks to the
insight into the inscrutability of freedom as one of Kant's most important
contributions to an understanding of morality: "What makes Kant both
distinctive and attractive remains his emphasis on freedom from empirical influence in determining the content of the moral law and acting on the
basis of it" (163).
Now, the question naturally arises how to reconcile these seemingly
opposing claims: the significance of empirical anthropology for a comprehensive account of Kant's moral philosophy on the one hand, and the
Kantian emphasis on the trans-empirical "inscrutability" of freedom on
the other. This exactly is the question Frierson wants to tackle-no doubt
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an ambitious project because, as he maintains, "no one has yet offered a
sufficient integration of Kant's moral anthropology with his conception of
freedom" (8).
In the first part of his book Frierson gives a detailed analysis of the
problem. By insisting on (1) the non-empirical status of freedom, (2) the
truly empirical character of anthropological knowledge, and (3) the substantial importance of anthropology for a full understanding of Kant's
moral philosophy, Frierson bars all easy ways out of the dilemma. In the
second part of the book he finally claims to come up with a solution.
A concept that frequently occurs in part II of Frierson's book is the notion of hope. This and similar terms are of strategic significance, because
they allow for bridging the gap between trans-empirical freedom and
empirical anthropology without simply merging these two dimensions of
analysis. Although the moral will is not, strictly speaking, dependent on
any hope, since it has its own motivating force (i.e., respect for the moral
law), the factual development of a moral character would be a purely heroic endeavor likely to fail, unless human beings could find some reasonable encouragement in the empirical appearances of their behavior that
indicate that they are actually on the right track. It is in this sense that
hope or encouragement is pragmatically needed both in one's moral selfeducation as well as in the moral education of others. Such a pragmatic
need for hope even extends into a religious dimension without which the
human propensity to "radical evil" would likely lead to despair and thus
the collapse of any attempts to moral self-cultivation. The tension between
the unconditioned claims of morality on the one hand, and the experience
of human frailty and even wickedness, on the other, may lead human beings to invest hope in divine grace as a complement to their never-ending
moral endeavors.
However, hope differs from knowledge. It is highly important to keep
that difference in mind. Were human beings able to acquire definitive
knowledge about their own moral progress, they would likely end up in
complacency, i.e. an attitude that corrupts the earnestness of the moral
will altogether. The ultimate non-knowledge in questions of moral performance therefore deserves to be appreciated as something positive.
Likewise, moral encouragement in education differs from all forms of
empirical manipulation that might accomplish certain behavior but will
eventually fail to bring about a genuinely moral will. Again, the lack of
direct pedagogical knowledge and influence on the development of a
pupil's moral will is something positive. Generally speaking, the integration of empirical anthropology into moral philosophy has to be a critical integration of such a kind that the insight into the final inscrutability of
freedom remains uncompromised. This, however, is to say that the precise
way in which empirical forces can exercise some influence on the moral
will ultimately goes beyond empirical investigation. Or, to put it a bit provocatively, what Kant writes about divine grace is symptomatic also of the
more "mundane" aids to the moral will, namely, that their actual functioning remains philosophically unfathomable.
In fact, the "solution" that Frierson offers in part II of his book does
not really" solve" the problem of how exactly empirical anthropology can
make a difference for the development of the moral will while at the same
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time leaving the autonomy of the will intact. Instead, part II of the book in
a way operates as a continuation of part I by giving a detailed and careful
description of the problem-together with an intention to bar easy solutions. Thus, Frierson goes on arguing against the possible misunderstanding (at times to be found in the Kant literature) that an empirical assistance
to the development and stabilization of the moral will, although certainly
"needed" in a general way, could be taken as a strictly "necessary" precondition for the very possibility of a good will: "The need for empirical
aids to combat radical evil does not mark an exception to Kant's principle
of 'ought implies can'" (135).
Does Frierson succeed with his project to integrate Kant's anthropology into his moral philosophy? The answer is yes and no. At the conclusion of the book Frierson claims to have shown that "Kant can reconcile
his strong conception of freedom with a robust moral anthropology" (p.
166). Such reconciliation, however, is not tantamount to a full integration.
As Frierson himself repeatedly emphasizes, empirical anthropology and
the concept of freedom cannot be reduced to one another, and the way in
which they relate to each other finally remains opaque. This is not a bad
result since it enhances the awareness of the limits of any empirical inquiry, an insight which, as Frierson persuasively argues, remains relevant
as "a Kantian legacy for today" (165).

Symbolic Representation in Kant's Practical Philosophy, by Heiner Bielefeldt.
Cambridge University Press, 2003. Pp. 202. $60.00 (cloth).
PATRICK R. FRIERSON, Whitman College

Symbolic Representation in Kant's Practical Philosophy is a sweeping book,
covering a wide variety of important topics in Kant's practical philosophy,
ranging from Kant's categorical imperative to his accounts of history and
religion. The book has eight chapters. In the first, Bielefeldt introduces the
overall purpose of the book in two ways. First, he explains that "the general purpose of this book is to show that Kant's practical philosophy can
help us to develop an appropriate language of liberal ethics in the broadest sense" (3). Second, the book's "purpose ... is to reconstruct the role
that symbolic representation plays in the entire architecture of Kant's practical philosophy" (10). Although Bielefeldt has some provocative hints in
his introduction and conclusion regarding the first point, the second is
really the focus of the book. With the exception of occasional references to
the political dangers of dogmatic or overly skeptical approaches to ethics
(e.g., "bigotry" on p. 32 or "ideological witch hunts" on p. 103), liberalism
does not appear in the core of the book. And Bielefeldt makes no systematic effort to show how the specific way in which Kant uses symbolic representation is well suited to liberal ethics.! Still, this frame sets a context
of political and ethical relevance for what might otherwise be a book of
interest primarily for Kant's scholars.
The second task, of reconstructing the role of symbolic representation in the whole of Kant's philosophy, provides Bielefeldt with a rubric

